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3Abstract
For many, social networks have become the primary source of news, although
the correctness of the provided information and its trustworthiness are often
unclear. The investigations of the 2016 US presidential elections have brought
the existence of external campaigns to light aiming at affecting the general
political public opinion. In this paper, we investigate whether a similar
influence on political elections can be observed in Europe as well. To this
end, we use the past German federal election as an indicator and inspect
the propaganda on Twitter, based on data from a period of 268 days. We
find that 79 trolls from the US campaign have also acted upon the German
federal election spreading right-wing views. Moreover, we develop a detector
for finding automated behavior that enables us to identify 2,414 previously
unknown bots.
41 Introduction
The use of social media for propaganda purposes has become an integral part of cyber
warfare [1]. Most prominently, in 2016 the US presidential elections have been targeted
by a Russian interference campaign on Twitter [2]. However, the use of online propaganda
is not an isolated phenomenon, but a global challenge [20, 24, 25]. The effect of political
propaganda and fake news is further amplified by journalists that use Twitter to acquire
“cutting-edge information” when chasing down trending topics for their next story [4, 5],
and distribute them via traditional media.
In this paper, we investigate whether a similar influence on political elections can be
observed in Europe as well and thus analyze the Twitter coverage of the German federal
election (Bundestagswahl) to figure out if the public opinion has been influenced and by
how much. To this end, we have collected 9.5 million tweets related to the hashtags of
all major German parties over 268 days, from January to September 2017. In contrast to
earlier work on the influence on Twitter [3, 21, 31], we focus on basic features that can
directly be derived from the Tweets and their metadata, such as the number of retweets
or quotes. The mere quantity of tweets is already sufficient to identify distinct events
in time, that precede the election day, for instance, the presentation of the political
manifestos of the individual parties or TV shows covering the election.
We start with the investigation of the influence of troll accounts of the Internet
Research Agency (IRA), which have been disclosed in the context of the investigations of
Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential elections [26, 27]. We find that 79 of
these trolls have also been active for the German federal election, resulting in a total
amount of 9,309 tweets in our dataset. Based on these first impressions we broaden our
perspective to the entire political landscape looking for indicators of propaganda. In a
detailed analysis, we survey specific topics and how these are related to political parties as
well as individual users that have contributed to them. For instance, topics related to the
controversial right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) have been predominant
during the election, including supporting as well as opposing positions.
Additionally, we develop a detector that is able to rate automated behavior in order to
identify bot accounts in our dataset, which have been identified for being a root cause
for the amplification of propaganda [30]. Using this classifier we find 2,919 previously
unknown bots, which represent 12.19% of all user accounts in our dataset. While this
number seems surprisingly large, it is perfectly in line with previous research, which
states that 9–15% of all active Twitter accounts are bots [28]. However, differentiating
the automated behavior of bots and the repetitive manual actions of eagerly tweeting
users is particularly difficult. Thus our results should be rather seen as first indicators.
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In summary, we make the following contributions:
Analysis of Known Actors. We identify 79 known actors involved in propaganda
by correlating the published IRA troll accounts with the users from our dataset.
Investigation of the Propaganda Landscape. We analyze the largest dataset
of tweets in the context of the German federal election, in particular, 9.5 million
tweets over 268 days, and inspect them regarding indicators of propaganda.
Detection of Automated Propaganda. We effectively detect 2,414 previously
unknown bots that contribute to propaganda by implementing a classifier that can
identify automated account behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the basic
properties of our dataset that has been recorded during and prior to the German federal
election. In Section 3, we investigate the presence of known propaganda actors in this
data, before we discuss the overall political landscape of the dataset regarding indicators
of propaganda in Section 4. Subsequently, we describe and evaluate our bot detector in
Section 5. Related work is discussed in Section 6, while Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The German Federal Election on Twitter
For our analysis, we consider 9.5 million tweets that have been published in the context
of the German federal election (Bundestagswahl) and have been collected over 268 days,
from January to September 2017. As we are relying on the publicly available Twitter
Stream, we receive maximally 1% of all publicly available tweets. This limit, however, is
only hit seldom. Due to random sampling, the subsequently reported numbers can be
safely extrapolated and the drawn conclusions remain valid. To restrict our analysis to
the German federal election, we apply the search terms shown in Table 1, that correspond
to the abbreviations of the major German parties1. For Die Grünen and Die Linke we
use different common abbreviations, derived from the list of recognized parties by the
Federal Electoral Committee [12], as these do not bear official acronyms.
Based on a manual plausibility examination of the collected data on a sample basis, we
found an exceptionally high amount of tweets in Portuguese language matching the search
term fdp. Further investigation revealed that fdp is a commonly used abbreviation for a
Portuguese swearword that is tainting our dataset. Due to the fact that the language
of the affected tweets is not correctly identified by Twitter, we cannot use this feature
for filtering. Instead, we completely exclude all tweets that contain the search term fdp,
which has accounted for 7.56% of the tweets.
In the following, we focus on the 8,845,879 remaining tweets for further analysis. We
proceed with the detection of known propaganda actors in our dataset.
3 Known Actors
In the course of the investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential
elections, Twitter has composed a list of accounts that are linked to the Internet Research
1We consider all parties that have cleared the 5% threshold in the previous federal election (2013) or in
one of the previous state elections (2014 – 2016). We additionally consider the NPD that has closely
failed the threshold (4.9%) in Saxony in 2014.
6Table 1: Search terms used for the data acquisition.
Party Political Direction Term
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) Right-wing to far-right afd
Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) Christ ian-democratic, liberal-
conservative
cdu
Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) Christian-democratic, conserva-
tive
csu
Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) (Classical) Liberal fdp
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Green politics gruene∗
Die Linke Democratic socialist linke†
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) Ultra-nationalists npd
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) Social-democratic spd
Agency (IRA) [26] and had been identified to be influential during the US elections. An
updated list was forwarded to the US Congress in June 2018 [27] and released to the
public to foster further research on the behavior of those accounts [23].
Based on the assumption that existing Twitter accounts are often reused for other
purposes, we try to identify the same trolls in our dataset. To this end, we match the list
of the 2,752 published IRA troll accounts to the user accounts from our dataset. Since
the screen name of a user account can be freely changed, we first map the obtained
screen names to their corresponding unique user IDs [32]. In doing so, we are able to
detect 79 of the IRA troll accounts in our dataset which is 0.02% of the total number
of users. Surprisingly, only one of the identified accounts has changed its screen name
during this time. However, the identified accounts are only responsible for a total amount
of 9,309 tweets that is 0.06% of the tweets from our dataset, rendering their potential
direct influence comparably low. Interestingly, 79.75% of the identified accounts have
tweeted less than 35 tweets over the entire time span, while the top 3 troll accounts
published more than 1,000 tweets each. Similarly, to the entire dataset, most of the
trolls’ tweets are actually retweets (4,341); however, there is also a significant amount
of original tweets (3,520) and fewer quotes (1,448). Due to the fact that the list of IRA
accounts was made publicly available a significant time ago, it is likely that the IRA has
created new accounts that we are not aware of, yet.
Figure 1a shows the creation dates of the IRA accounts over the last few years. Most
of the IRA accounts have been created before November 2016, the month of the US
presidential elections, with a significant peak in July 2016. However, additional IRA
accounts have been created between the beginning and mid-2017 which means right
before the German federal election. Figure 1b shows the number of tweet contributions
of the IRA accounts in the context of the 2017 German federal election. Unsurprisingly,
there is a strong increase of tweets over the year 2017, with its highest peaks at the
beginning of September, the month of the election, and particularly on the day of the
election itself.
Finally, to examine the impact of the IRA accounts on other users, we verify if other
accounts do interact with the IRA troll accounts, for instance, by retweeting their tweets.
First of all 4,341 of the tweets posted by IRA accounts have been retweeted. Only 16
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Figure 1: Internet Research Agency (IRA) troll accounts.
tweets originate from the known IRA accounts, leaving the large remainder to other users.
Interestingly, the 1,448 quoted tweets from IRA accounts have all been quoted by other
users, that are outside the peer group of known IRA accounts. Although the majority of
the other users are likely regular user accounts, there seem to be a fraction of accounts
that are unknown troll accounts, we are not aware of. We conclude that although the
amount of IRA accounts and corresponding tweets is low, in comparison to the total
amount of recorded users and tweets, there is a verifiable impact from the IRA accounts
on other accounts of the dataset.
4 Propaganda Landscape
Based on our analysis of known propaganda actors, we broaden our perspective by taking
the general political propaganda landscape into account. To this end, we proceed with an
analysis of the total tweet corpus to verify if the same ratio of original tweets, retweets
and quotes can be observed for all collected tweets and parties.
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Figure 2: Development of tweet types over time.
Figure 2 shows the temporal development for original tweets (blue), retweets (yellow),
and quoted tweets (green). Notice that the amount of retweets significantly exceeds the
other two tweet types. Consequently, these are a particularly strong factor of amplification
when spreading opinions. Original or quoted tweets occur roughly 60−75% less frequent,
each. However, the general trend leading up to the collection’s highest value at election
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Figure 3: Top-10 individual hashtags and combinations.
day, and the shape of the amount’s development corresponds to all three types.
Throughout the recording, we observe local peaks that may be attributed to dis-
tinct events in time, which we briefly discuss in the following: In January the Federal
Constitutional Court has ruled in favor of not banning the far-right, nationalists party
NPD, which has been preceded and succeeded by heated debates. The state elections of
Schleswig-Holstein (SH), Saarland (SL), and North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), in turn,
have only triggered mediocre response, whereas the presentation of the election manifestos
for the German federal election partly receives significant attention. Particularly, the
publication of the manifesto of the right-wing party AfD at the end of April is noteworthy
at this point. Starting in August, we record a strong increase of tweets leading up to the
federal election day on 24th of September. This rise is supported by several political talk
shows, such as TV Duell and Fünfkampf at the beginning of September.
To get a clearer view of the involved user accounts and topics, we further analyze the
most frequent hashtags, media files, and quoted/retweeted user accounts.
Hashtags
Among the ten most used hashtags we observe the acronyms of five political parties that
have been up for election. Figure 3a shows a summary of the top 10 hashtags and their
number of occurrences. Interestingly, the party that has triggered the largest peak in
tweets when presenting their election manifesto, the AfD, also peaks in total as hashtag
#afd, with 1,968,601 occurrences. Thereby, the AfD occurs three times more often than
the second-placed SPD with 631,209 occurrences. The general hashtag for the German
federal election, #btw, in turn, is only used in 442,457 tweets. On the sixth place, with
the campaign #traudichdeutschland, the AfD takes a prominent position for a second time
with 176,677 mentions.
Moreover, in Figure 3b we consider the most used combinations of hashtags and
observe a similar dominance of the AfD. The hashtag #afd appears in four out of ten
different combinations. In summary, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) seems to be
particularly active on Twitter in comparison to other parties.
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the location of the most AfD votes.
(b) Longish text about why eligible vot-
ers should not vote for AfD.
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Figure 4: Selection from most tweeted media from the dataset.
Media
Next, we discuss the five most frequently tweeted images that are related to the election
(see Figure 4). With 6,027 occurrences, Figure 4a, showing two heat maps of Germany,
is the most popular. It displays the proportion of foreigners per region on the left and
the proportion of AfD voters per region on the right, showing a drastic imbalance. The
image in Figure 4b, tweeted 2,911 times, shows a longish text about why eligible voters
should not vote for the AfD. Using an image for a long text was very common in the
early days of Twitter, since until November 2017 Twitter restricted the maximum number
of characters per tweet to 140. The third most tweeted picture shows a black and white
portrait of the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl who died on the 16th of June,
2017. This news with the corresponding picture was tweeted 1,844 times.
The pictures shown in Figure 4d and Figure 4e occur 1,680 and 1,469 times, respectively,
and also concern the AfD. However, this images likewise popularize against the party
by, on the one hand, showing a comment of the British author A. Moore explaining the
idiocy of protest votes and, on the other hand, displaying a fake AfD election poster,
that was published by the German political satire show heute-show. Thus, the spike in
hashtags likely cannot be traced back to the involvement of supporters alone, but also to
opponents of this controversial party.
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Figure 5: Top 10 quotes and retweets.
Quoted/Retweeted Users
As a measure of the popularity and influence of individual accounts, we also look at the
most quoted and retweeted users on our recording. Figure 5a and Figure 5b show the
top 10 users for both categories. Interestingly, @AfD_Bund, and @Beatrix_vStorch are
present in both rankings. The first is the official account of the AfD party, and the latter
is an AfD politician, so are @FraukePetry, @SteinbachErika, @lawyerberlin, and@Alice_Weidel.
Consequently, the list of the ten most retweeted users is largely dominated by one party.
The remaining accounts, @66Freedom66 and @DoraBromberger, advertise right-wing views
and thus being also in line with the party.
Furthermore, three other political parties are rather prominently present: @CDU, @CSU,
and @SPD. Especially the latter, the left-wing social democrats, have two politicians
among the top 10 quoted user accounts (@Ralf_Stegner and @MartinSchulz). The remaining
accounts mainly correspond to popular German news magazines: @welt, @tagesschau,
@wahlrecht_de, and @ZDFheute.
5 Detecting Automated Propaganda
Based on our findings on the political landscape in our dataset, we proceed with the
identification of automatic bot behavior, which holds responsible for being one of the
root causes for the amplification of heavily discussed political topics [30]. To this end,
we apply a supervised machine learning approach to detect bots.
Although the general topic of bot detection is well-known, the detection of political
social bots, in particular, is still an open challenge, as indicated in related work [e.g.,
9, 13]. On the one hand, this is due to its diverse characteristics, involving the political
direction and target audience, and, on the other hand, due to the constant evolution of
social bots that are approaching a more human-like behavior by imitating common usage
patterns [13, 19].
For the implementation of our classifier, we make use of the insights gained from the
identified IRA trolls and saliences found in our in-depth analysis of the political landscape.
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Labeling
As the dataset has been just recorded for this purpose, there are no existing labels of
bots and humans, respectively, available that are required to train a supervised machine
learning model. We therefore manually attribute Twitter accounts for both classes using a
set of simple heuristics. These include a test for repetitive behavior of the same tweeting
pattern, a frequently posting of tweets without adhering sleep breaks at least every 48 h
or tweeting of multiple hashtags from the trending topics combined with a URL, etc.
Even for trained experts, the distinction between humans and bot remains a difficult
challenge. To avoid wrongly labeled training samples, we concentrate on those accounts
for which we could identify the class with high confidence. As a result, we gathered 505
bot and 874 human accounts in total for the training of the classifier.
Features
Based on the heuristics that were used to manually label the training data, we proceed
with the engineering of additional features to improve the bot detection rate by exploring
the available tweet and user profile information from our dataset. We engineered 44
unique features that are covering the four main categories of metadata-based, text-based,
time-based and user-based features. The metadata-based features include features such as
the average number of tweets per day, the number of different clients used or the retweet-
to-tweet ratio. In contrast, the text-based features comprise, for instance, the average
tweet length, the vocabulary diversity or the URL ratio. Furthermore, the time-based
features involve the longest average break within 48 h the median time between a retweet,
the original tweet, etc. Finally, the user-based features imply, for example, the number of
followers, the account verification status or the voluntary disclosure of being a bot. The
complete list of derived features is presented in Table 3.
Models
We train and evaluate seven different machine learning algorithms for the classification
of bots and humans. This includes the statistical-based LogisticRegression model, the
non-parametric KNeighbors model as well as the decision tree models RandomForest,
AdaBoost and GradientBoosting. Apart from that the two support vector machine
learning variants LinearSVC and SVC are applied and evaluated for their aptitude.
We proceed with the application of our classifier in two experiments: a controlled
experiment and an extrapolation of our findings. While the first controlled experiment
targets the validation of our classifier on the previously labeled training data and
comparison to Botometer [11] as a baseline, the second extrapolate our findings by
applying the classifier on the remainder of our unlabeled dataset as an indicator of the
human-bot-ratio within the entire dataset.
5.1 Controlled Experiment
Next, we apply the selected machine learning models to our training data by making use
of 10-fold cross-validation and repeating the experiments 100 times, followed by averaging
the result metrics. We identify the best parameter combination per classifier, by employing
a grid search, optimizing for the metric of best average Area Under Curve (AUC). Table 2
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Table 2: Results of the tested classifiers.
Classifier Avg. F1-Score Avg. AUC
GradientBoosting 0.891± 0.033 0.976± 0.011
RandomForest 0.861± 0.039 0.972± 0.013
AdaBoost 0.885± 0.035 0.971± 0.013
SVC 0.851± 0.038 0.949± 0.021
LogisticRegression 0.841± 0.043 0.946± 0.021
LinearSVC 0.821± 0.040 0.934± 0.025
KNeighbors 0.704± 0.060 0.871± 0.034
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Figure 6: Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) of GradientBoosting vs. Botometer.
shows the examined classifiers with the best parameters found for each classifier type,
sorted by the average AUC overall repetitions in descending order. We further compute
the F1-Score for a single value comparison that considers both the precision and the
recall likewise. The best performance for each metric is shown in the table. The best
performing classifier, regarding the average AUC, is the GradientBoosting classifier with
an AUC of 0.972 and 0.1-bounded AUC with 0.907.
Baseline
As a baseline, we compare our results to the predictions of Botometer, formerly known as
BotOrNot [11], a popular bot classifier that is publicly available on the Internet. To this
end, we query the Botometer API for each of the previously labeled Twitter accounts
from the training dataset to obtain a corresponding bot score. The Botometer classifier
yields an AUC of 0.802 and a value of 0.679 if the false positive rate is bound to 0.1, that
is, a false alarm rate of 10%. Figure 6 shows the two ROC curves of Botometer and
our improved GradientBoosting classifier. Our novel classifier outperforms the mature
Botometer classifier on our dataset by providing significantly better results.
5.2 Extrapolated Findings
As an indicator of the human-bot-ratio within our entire dataset, we apply the best
performing classifier (GradientBoosting) on the remainder of our extracted user dataset.
We focus on the 23,949 potentially interesting users that have published at least 30 tweets
during the collection period. Using our classifier we obtained predictions for 20,157 human
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and 2,414 bot accounts. In total, that means in combination with the previously manu-
ally labeled accounts, we can identify 21,030 human (87.81%) and 2,919 bot (12.19%)
accounts within the potentially interesting Twitter accounts. Though we do not have
labels for the complete user dataset to verify our predictions, our results seem consistent
with the recent study of Varol et al. [28], who claim that between 9% and 15% of active
Twitter accounts are likely to be bots.
6 Related Work
In the past, a plethora of research on various aspects of social media and Twitter has
been conducted. In the following, we discuss the major points of contact with our work:
Analyses of Political Elections.
The first line of research deals with the analysis of political elections on Twitter. For
instance, Franco-Riquelme et al. [14] as well as Prati and Said-Hung [18] investigate the
2015 and 2016 general elections in Spain. While Franco-Riquelme et al. [14] measure the
regional support of political parties on Twitter during the electoral periods in 2015 and
2016, Prati and Said-Hung [18] focus on the two trending topics #24M and #Elections2015
on the election day in 2015 and build a predictive model to infer the ideological orientation
of tweets. Also the US 2016 presidential elections on Twitter are a topic of ongoing
research: For instance, Sainudiin et al. [22] characterize the Twitter networks of the major
presidential candidates, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, with various American hate
groups defined by the US Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), while Caetano et al.
[6] analyze the political homophily of users on Twitter during the 2016 US presidential
elections using sentiment analysis.
Furthermore, there are recent works on the 2017 German federal election: Gimpel
et al. [15] collect a representative dataset on the German federal election and conduct
a cluster analysis to derive eleven emergent roles from the most active users, while
Morstatter et al. [17] try to discover communities and their corresponding themes during
the German federal election. Subsequently, they analyze how content is generated by
those communities and how the communities interact with each other.
Bot Detection.
The second line of research deals with the detection of bots on Twitter. Most recent works
include Chavoshi et al. [8] who present a correlation finder to identify colluding user
accounts using la-sensitive hashing. This has the advantage that no labels are required
as for supervised approaches. In contrast, Cresci et al. [10] study the phenomenon of
social spambots on Twitter and provide quantitative evidence for a paradigm-shift in
spambot design. The authors claim that the new generation of bots imitates human
behavior, thus making them harder to detect.
Walt and Eloff [29] try to detect fake accounts that have been created by humans.
To this end, a corpus of human account profiles was enriched with engineered features
that had previously been used to detect fake accounts by bots. The tested supervised
machine learning algorithms, could only detect the fake accounts with a F1 score of
14
49.75%, showing that human-created fake accounts are much harder to detect than bot
created accounts.
Kudugunta and Ferrara [16] use a deep neural network based on contextual long
short-term memory (LSTM) to detect bots at tweet level. Using synthetic minority
oversampling, a large dataset is generated that is required to train the model. As a result,
an AUC of 0.99 is achieved. Recently, Castillo et al. [7] study the use of bots in the 2017
presidential elections in Chile. They manually derive labels for the training data and
then build a classifier for detecting bots. Though the model reached good results in the
training stage, the testing results were not as good as they hoped.
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In comparison to the above-mentioned classifiers, our detector makes use of features
from multiple categories of different domains i.e., metadata, text, time and user-profile,
to cover all aspects of modern bot behavior.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed a total of 9.5 million tweets to investigated the dissemination of
propaganda in the context of the German federal election. We find that 79 of the trolls of
Internet Research Agency (IRA) that have already been influencing the US presidential
elections in 2016 have also been active a year later in Germany.
Based on these finding and the knowledge about the significance of retweets and quoted
tweets for propaganda purposes, we have then broadened our analysis to the general
political landscape. In this scope, we have particularly inspected the most tweeted
hashtags and images as well as the involved users. Our evaluation shows that especially
the right-wing party AfD has played a prominent role in several controversial discussions.
The hashtag #afd, for instance, dominates the top-10 ranking of hashtag combinations
and also the most retweeted users are all involved with this right-wing party. Given
the partly significant influence on the public discourse on Twitter, it remains an open
question whether this influence is driven by automated efforts and bots. The detector we
have developed has enabled us to identify 2,919 previously unknown bots in our dataset,
which account for 12.19% of all user accounts.
The large proportion of automated accounts highlights the potential danger when used
for propaganda purposes. While it has been inconclusive whether the propaganda efforts
observed in our dataset is mainly attributable to bot accounts, our study of the German
federal election clearly shows that the political landscape heavily relies on propaganda
on social media. Particularly troublesome is the amount of right-wing positions featured
in the data.
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Table 3: Engineered features used for classifying automated propaganda, subdivided by four
categories.
Feature Description
M
et
ad
at
a-
ba
se
d
avg_tweets_per_day Average number of tweets per day.
total_tweets Total number of tweets.
orig_ratio Ratio of own composed tweets to total tweets
retweet_ratio Ratio of retweeted tweets to total tweets.
quote_ratio Ratio of quoted tweets to total number of tweets.
reply_ratio Ratio of replies to total number of tweets.
twitter_client Used Twitter client (→ terms mapped via tf-idf).
official_client Use of the official Twitter client.
total_clients Total number of used Twitter clients.
unique_users_retweet_ratio Ratio of unique users in retweets.
unique_users_quotes_ratio Ratio of unique users in quotes.
unique_users_retweet_ratio Ratio of unique users in replies.
longest_conversation Longest conversation with a user.
unique_users_conv_ratio Ratio of unique users in conversations.
Te
xt
-b
as
ed
avg_text_len Average length of tweet text.
std_text_len Standard Deviation of the length of tweet text.
url_ratio Ratio of tweets with URL.
unique_url_ratio Ratio of unique URLs in tweets.
unique_url_host_ratio Ratio of unique host names in URLs.
vocabulary_diversity Diversity of used vocabulary in tweets.
mentions_ratio Ratio of mentions to tweets.
hashtags_ratio Ratio of hashtags to tweets.
unique_mentions_ratio Ratio of unique mentions to tweets.
unique_hashtags_ratio Ratio of unique hashtags to tweets.
ending_hashtags_ratio Ratio of tweets that ends with a hashtags.
starting_mention_ratio Ratio of tweets that starts with a mention.
starting_rt_ratio Ratio of tweets that starts with RT.
zip_ratio Ratio of tweets after zipping to original size.
user_simhash Simhash of all tweets per user.
avg_duplicate_simhash Average of tweets that have similar simhash.
duplicate_simhash_ratio Ratio of all duplicates to amount of from-users.
T
im
e-
ba
se
d chi_square_seconds χ2-distribution of seconds of tweet creations.
avg_longest_break Longest break of a user every 48 h on avg.
avg_second_longest_break Second longest break of a user every 48 h on avg.
median_retweet Median timespan between retweet & orig. tweet.
median_quote Median timespan between a quote & orig. tweet.
U
se
r-
ba
se
d
total_friends Total number of friends.
total_followers Total number of followers.
friend_follower_ratio Ratio of number of friends to number of followers.
has_default_profile_image Has the default profile image.
has_default_user_image Has the default user image.
is_verified Is a verified Twitter account.
has_geo_coordinates User has geo coordinates enabled.
self_bot User account contains the term ‘bot’ in name.
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